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The fundamental fact about Husserl's treatment of problems indicated by such words as "sign," "expression," and "indication," is that he deals with them, not as In the first place, I may be conscious of something as, for example, a physical thing, or else as a mental process, or else as a proposition. Then, if we examine one of these possibilities-for example, that I am conscious of something as a physical thingwe find that there are many specific modes of consciousness belonging to that general kind. Thus, I may be perceptively conscious of something as a physical thing-tactually perceptive, or seeing, or hearing-or else as I may remember something as a physical thing perceived by me in the past, or again as a thing depicted by a picture I am now 3 perceiving or remembering, or yet again as something denoted by a verbal expression embodied in marks or sounds I am perceiving or remembering. And, over against all these modes of consciousness we find what we may call "their phantasy modifications": corresponding to a perceiving, a phantasied or fictive perceiving; corresponding to the consciousness of something as depicted by a perceived picture, a consciousness of it as depicted by a phantasied or fictive picture; and so forth.
Taking another general kind of consciousness-let us say consciousness of something as a mental process-we find an at least roughly corresponding variety of specific modes of consciousness. In case I mean the thing in question as my own mental process, I may be conscious of it as now going on; and this mode of consciousness is, in some respects, like the perceiving of a physical thing. Again I may remember something as a past mental process, in a manner somewhat analogous to the manner in which I remember something as a physical thing perceived in the past. Furthermore, I may understand one verbal expression as denoting a physical thing, e.g., Halley's Comet, Already we have touched on two points at which Husserl's general account differs from other accounts that are widely accepted. The first of these points was indicated by our statement that, over against the perceiving or the remembering of something and, indeed, over against the consciousness of something as depicted or as denoted, we find what was called a "phantasy-modifications" of each of these modes of consciousness.
The second was indicated by our statement that not only the perceiving of something but also the remembering of something as past-perceived is a mode of direct consciousness.
The first of these indicates a perhaps novel distinction between so-called phantasy modifications, on the one hand, and that specific kind of phantasy modification which consists fictively perceiving something as an image or picture of something else. The second indicates Husserl's opposition to the widely held opinion that remembering involves images. It is related to his theory of perception as not involving such images or "ideas." Both points are of fundamental importance for his whole theory of indirect consciousness in general and for his treatment of the specific phenomena commonly indicated by such words as sign, indication, symbol, and image. Let us elaborate the second of these points and, in so doing, confine our attention to various modes of consciousness of things as physical.
In this sphere the contrast between the modes of direct and the modes of indirect consciousness is presented most clearly and simply when we compare seeing what we take to be a physical thing itself and seeing what we take to be a picture of that thing. The image of what one means as the same thing. Indeed, one can not only remember directly but also phantasy remembering directly-as one is prone to do when the thing as genuinely remembered is vague or fragmentary. But the differences between these modes of consciousness and a non-fictive direct consciousness of something as past-perceived are directly observable and describable differences.
The prejudice against the fact that things can be directly remembered as we believe we perceived them in the past; the prejudice in favor of the theory that remembering involves having a representative image of what is remembered-is very strong in most members of the Western cultural community. To many it seems axiomatic that the object of a direct consciousness must be simultaneous with that consciousnessthat, in other words, the object of a direct consciousness must somehow exist and, moreover, exist at the same time as the consciousness of it. And from this pseudo-axiom it indeed follows that, if I am now conscious of something as past, I must be directly conscious of something else, contemporaneous with my present consciousness and somehow representing for me the thing I mean as past. The fundamental error in all this is the belief that consciousness of something involves the existence, in some manner or other, of something that is the object of the consciousness-if not its existence in reality then at least its existence as somehow in the mind of the person who is conscious of something. It is an error that commonly pervades whole theories of consciousness and not just theories of consciousness of the past or theories of indirect consciousness. The seeing we do in dreams is as direct as the seeing we do in waking life. But the simple truth is that the events seen in dreams are non-existent, even though the seeing of them does exist. The events seen in dreams, I say, simply do not exist. They do not exist, more particularly, as ideas or images "in my mind" except in the metaphorical sense that applies to anything of which I happen to be conscious-a sense that implies no more than that, be they existent or non-existent, I happen to be conscious of them. And in that sense the sun itself is as truly in my mind when I see it as an image of a dragon is in my mind when I phantasy seeing a picture of a dragon. In a strict sense, however, the image or fictive picture is no more in my mind than is the sun itself.
In calling the perceiving of something, or the remembering of something as pastperceived, or the fictive perceiving of something, or again the fictive remembering of some things as past-perceived, modes of "direct" consciousness of the things in question, we have contrasted them all with the consciousness of something as depicted, or denoted, or symbolized, or represented by something else-whether the consciousness of this something else be itself direct or indirect and, furthermore, whether (in case it is direct) it is a perceiving or a fictive perceiving, a remembering or a fictive remembering. And the sense in which we refer to some modes of consciousness as direct, and to others as indirect, must be understood accordingly. This will be clearer if we point out that a 8 consciousness which is direct in the relevant sense of the word may nevertheless be mediated. For example, the perceiving of something as a physical thing is a direct consciousness but mediated. I am now perceiving my pen directly; but I am perceiving it, so to speak, "through" visual and tactual "appearances"; and, at least in the case of the tactual appearance, there is further mediation, in that the tactual appearance, through which I feel the pen, is there for me by virtue of the fact that I am conscious of sensations of certain kinds as located in my hand. But this mediatedness of sensuous perceivings is a different matter than the indirectness of the consciousness of things as, for example, depicted by other things.
The depictive thing is, so to speak, a "terminal" object, just as the thing depicted is a "terminal" object. And this is the case whether the depictive object be perceived or only fictively perceived, as when I phantasy that I am seeing something that depicts something else. The visual appearance or perspective, through which I look directly at a physical thing is, on the other hand, not a terminal object and not, in the same sense, a picture. I do not look directly through a picture at what it depicts as I look through a visual perspective at what it mediates. A picture or a statue, moreover, can be an existent reality in spatial and temporal and causal relations with other realities. The like is not true of tactual and visual "perspectives." Obviously, there is an analogy between the relation of appearance to thing and the relation of picture-thing to depicted thing. If there were no such analogy, no one would have confounded them or made their confusion part of a theory.
All kinds and examples of direct consciousness that we have considered are not only direct but also, to some extent, clear or, as we may also say, "intuitive." In other 9 words: they are processes of being conscious of part of the directly meant object as not only meant but given. In sensuously perceiving something, I am directly conscious of it in its entirety; but I am conscious of only some parts and qualities of it as given. Or, to put it the other way around, I am directly conscious of the perceived thing as having more to it than it presents; and I am conscious of this more directly, though not intuitively.
Again, in the case of a clear remembering of something as past-perceived the thing is never perfectly clear; never is all that, in remembering it, one means as belonging to it, presented "again."
Moreover, in any perceiving or remembering of something as past-perceived, one is directly conscious also of other things, of something more as lying "beyond the horizons" of what is given, what is intuited. Thus anything that I may be conscious of as an event that I perceived in the past is directly meant as having had its temporal antecedents, contemporaries, and successors. And the broadest expanse of given space is meant as having its likewise directly meant, but non-presented, surroundings.
Nor is the non-intuitiveness of some processes of direct consciousness the same as indefiniteness. The style of what lies beyond the given may be meant with a high degree of definiteness. Thus the future, which is so notoriously invisible, is meant directly as something that will be, at least generically, like the past.
And, on the basis of a direct consciousness of the non-presented, we fill in and extend the horizons of our world by fictive perceivings and fictive rememberings.
